Saludaga v. FEU and De Jesus, G.R. No. 179337, 30 April 2008.



FACTS: Petitioner Joseph Saludaga was a sophomore law student of respondent Far Eastern University (FEU) when he was shot by Alejandro Rosete (Rosete), one of the security guards on duty at the school premises on August 18, 1996. Petitioner was rushed to FEU-Dr. Nicanor Reyes Medical Foundation (FEU-NRMF) due to the wound he sustained. Meanwhile, Rosete was brought to the police station where he explained that the shooting was accidental. Saludaga  thereafter filed a complaint for damages against respondents on the ground that they breached their obligation to provide students with a safe and secure environment and an atmosphere conducive to learning. Respondents, in turn, filed a Third-Party Complaint against Galaxy Development and Management Corporation (Galaxy), the agency contracted by respondent FEU to provide security services within its premises and Mariano D. Imperial (Imperial), Galaxys President, to indemnify them for whatever would be adjudged in favor of petitioner, if any; and to pay attorneys fees and cost of the suit.


ISSUE#1: What is the source of FEU’s obligation to indemnify Saludaga? What is needed to prove that this obligation of FEU exists?

ISSUE#2: In the alternative, is FEU vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.


HELD#1: Culpa contractual.

It is settled that in culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. In the instant case, we find that, when petitioner was shot inside the campus by no less the security guard who was hired to maintain peace and secure the premises, there is a prima facie showing that respondents failed to comply with its obligation to provide a safe and secure environment to its students.


[R]espondents cannot be held liable for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code because respondents are not the employers of Rosete. The latter was employed by Galaxy. The instructions issued by respondents Security Consultant to Galaxy and its security guards are ordinarily no more than requests commonly envisaged in the contract for services entered into by a principal and a security agency. They cannot be construed as the element of control as to treat respondents as the employers of Rosete.



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Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) v. Adil, Confesor and Villafuerte, et al., G.R. No. L-48889, 11 May 1989.


FACTS: On February 10, 1940 spouses Patricio Confesor and Jovita Villafuerte obtained an agricultural loan from the Agricultural and Industrial Bank (AIB), now the Development of the Philippines (DBP), in the sum of P2,000.00, Philippine Currency, as evidenced by a promissory note of said date whereby they bound themselves jointly and severally to pay the account in ten (10) equal yearly amortizations. As the obligation remained outstanding and unpaid even after the lapse of the aforesaid ten-year period, Confesor, who was by then a member of the Congress of the Philippines, executed a second promissory note on April 11, 1961 expressly acknowledging said loan and promising to pay the same on or before June 15, 1961. The trial court ordered the spouses to pay the loan but this was reversed on appeal.


ISSUE#1: Does prescription operate to discharge a debt even if it there was acknowledgment of the debtor?

ISSUE#2: Is the conjugal partnership of Confesor and Villafuerte bound by the execution of the second promissory note?




This is not a mere case of acknowledgment of a debt that has prescribed but a new promise to pay the debt. The consideration of the new promissory note is the pre-existing obligation under the first promissory note. The statutory limitation bars the remedy but does not discharge the debt. A new express promise to pay a debt barred … will take the case from the operation of the statute of limitations as this proceeds upon the ground that as a statutory limitation merely bars the remedy and does not discharge the debt, there is something more than a mere moral obligation to support a promise, to wit a – pre-existing debt which is a sufficient consideration for the new the new promise; upon this sufficient consideration constitutes, in fact, a new cause of action.


Under Article 165 of the Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. As such administrator, all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, are chargeable to the conjugal partnership. No doubt, in this case, respondent Confesor signed the second promissory note for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence the conjugal partnership is liable for this obligation.


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Ansay et al. v. National Development Company (NDC), G.R. No. L-13667, 29 April 1960.


FACTS: Ansay et al. filed against NDC a complaint praying for a 20% Christmas bonus for the years 1954 and 1955. The trial court dismissed the complaint ratiocinating that a bonus is an act of liberality and the court takes it that it is not within its judicial powers to command respondents to be liberal and that Ansay et al. admitted that NDC is not under legal duty to give such bonus and that the court has no power to compel a party to comply with a moral obligation (Art. 142, New Civil Code.). Ansay et al. appealed and argued that there exists a cause of action in their complaint because their claim rests on moral grounds or what in brief is defined by law as a natural obligation.

ISSUE: Is the grant of Christmas bonus for the years 1954 and 1955 demandable based on natural or moral obligation?


Article 1423 of the New Civil Code classifies obligations into civil or natural. “Civil obligations are a right of action to compel their performance. Natural obligations, not being based on positive law but on equity and natural law, do not grant a right of action to enforce their performance, but after voluntary fulfillment by the obligor, they authorize the retention of what has been delivered or rendered by reason thereof”. It is thus readily seen that an element of natural obligation before it can be cognizable by the court is voluntary fulfillment by the obligor. Certainly retention can be ordered but only after there has been voluntary performance. But here there has been no voluntary performance. In fact, the court cannot order the performance.


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Villaroel v. Estrada, G.R. No. L-47262, 19 December 1940.


FACTS: On May 9, 1912, Alejandro F. Callao, the mother of the defendant Juan F. Villarroel, obtained from the spouses Mariano Estrada and Severina a loan of P1,000 payable after seven years. Alejandra died, leaving as sole heir to the defendant. The spouses Mariano Estrada and Severina also died, leaving as sole heir the plaintiff Bernardino Estrada. On August 9, 1930, the defendant signed a document (Exhibit B) by which it declares the applicant to owe the amount of P1,000, with an interest of 12 percent per year. This action deals with the collection of this amount.

ISSUE: Is the defendant Juan under obligation to pay the loan that already prescribed if he subsequently declared that he owed it to plaintiff Bernardino?


Although the action to recover the original debt has already been prescribed when the claim was filed in this case, the question that arises in this appeal is mainly whether, notwithstanding such a prescription, the action (may be) brought. However, the present action is not based on the original obligation contracted by the defendant’s mother, who has already been prescribed, but in which the defendant contracted on August 9, 1930 upon assuming the fulfillment of that obligation, Already prescribed. Since the defendant is the sole inheritor of the primitive debtor, with the right to succeed in his inheritance, that debt, brought by his mother legally, although it has lost its effectiveness by prescription, is now, however, for a moral obligation, which is consideration Sufficient to create and render effective and enforceable its obligation voluntarily contracted on August 9, 1930 in Exhibit B.

The rule that a new promise to pay a pre-paid debt must be made by the same obligated person or by another legally authorized by it, is not applicable to the present case in which it is not required to fulfill the obligation of the obligee originally, but of which he voluntarily wanted to assume this obligation.


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My 17th Valentine’s Day With You

I love each day,

Skies blue and gray,

Just wanting to say,

That I’m here to stay,

It became a habit,

Not to set a limit,

On how to show it,

And how you love it,

We’re friends before,

I opened that door,

And walked that floor,

Sweethearts therefore,

But when we got married,

And our lives got welded,

The spark never ended,

Instead became unprecedented,

I will never get tired,

Holding your hand tight,

I will  keep your heart tied,

With my heart where it is wired,

I promise not to change,

On every single page,

Of our life and our age,

In and out of that hedge,

I won’t change a thing,

Like the way I sing,

I’ll keep on living,

I’ll keep on loving,

It’s been seventeen times,

That you’re my Valentine,

And it’s perfectly fine,

Now let’s drink that wine,

Seventeen once a year,

Seven hundred times sweeter,

Seven thousand folds lovelier,

And I’m forever your partner.

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Posted by on February 14, 2017 in Love and Relationships, Personal


Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119010, 05 September 1997.




On 20 may 1994, after the prosecution in the criminal case for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 rested its case, the defense asked orally for leave of court to file a written demurrer to evidence. Trial court judge made inferences to both the prosecution and defense and ruled to deny the demurrer; that if the defense would insist to file a written demurrer, they waive their right to present evidence, otherwise it will be dilatory; and if the defense will not present their evidence in that same day, their right to present evidence is deemed waived. Petitioner Bernardo filed the instant petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals on the ground that when it refused to allow petitioner to demur to the evidence the appellate court decided the matter not in accordance with law and applicable decisions of this Court. Petitioner submits that when her counsel moved for leave to file a demurrer to evidence on 20 May 1994 this meant that she intended to make a written demurrer after extensive research and with proper authorities to support the same; that when the trial court denied her motion, it was in effect a denial only of the motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence and not the demurrer to evidence itself and, therefore, the order of respondent appellate court allowing petitioner to present her evidence was premature. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the petitioner.


ISSUE: Can the petitioner be allowed to present evidence to support its demurrer to evidence after her motion for leave to admit such demurrer was denied?



[T]he new rule on demurrer to evidence the accused has the right to file a demurrer to evidence after the prosecution has rested its case. If the accused obtained prior leave of court before filing his demurrer, he can still present evidence if his demurrer is denied. However, if he demurs without prior leave of court, or after his motion for leave is denied, he waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for decision on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. This power to grant leave to the accused to file a demurrer is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. The purpose is to determine whether the accused in filing his demurrer is merely stalling the proceedings.

In the case at bar, petitioner admits that in the hearing of 20 May 1994 the trial court denied her motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. In such case, the only right petitioner has under Sec. 15, Rule 119, of the Rules of Court after having been denied leave to submit a demurrer is to adduce evidence in her defense. However, even without express leave of the trial court, nay, after her motion for leave was denied, petitioner insisted on filing a demurrer instead of presenting evidence in her defense.

Judicial action to grant prior leave to file demurrer to evidence is discretionary upon the trial court. But to allow the accused to present evidence after he was denied prior leave to file demurrer is not discretionary. Once prior leave is denied and the accused still files his demurrer to evidence or motion to dismiss, the court no longer has discretion to allow the accused to present evidence. The only recourse left for the court is to decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution. And, unless there is grave abuse thereof amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which is not present in the instant case, the trial court’s denial of prior leave to file demurrer to evidence or motion to dismiss may not be disturbed. However, any judgment of conviction by a trial court may still be elevated by the accused to the appellate court.


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Heirs of Miranda v. Pablo Miranda G.R. No. 179638, 08 July 2013.



Petitioners’ Complaint for Annulment of Titles and Specific Performance was decided by the RTC against their favor on August 30, 1999. Without any appeal, the Decision became final and executory. On December 11, 2001, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution but was not implemented. On July 8, 2005, respondent filed an Ex-parte Motion praying that the RTC issue a “Break-Open and Demolition Order” in order to compel the petitioners to vacate his property. But since more than five years have elapsed from the time the Writ of Execution should have been enforced, the RTC denied the Motion in its Order dated August 16, 2005. This prompted respondent to file with the RTC a Petition for Revival of Judgment, which was granted.

On July 13, 2006, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal via LBC, which was opposed by respondent on the ground that the Decision dated August 30, 1999 has long become final and executory. Petitioners, in turn, moved for the transmittal of the original records of the case to the CA, insisting that respondent’s opposition is without merit. Finding the appeal barred by prescription, the RTC denied the Notice of Appeal in its Order dated October 10, 2006. Feeling aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Mandamus with the CA praying that their Notice of Appeal be given due course, but was denied on June 14, 2007 for being filed out of time. Petitioners assert that an action to revive judgment is appealable, and that their appeal was perfected on time. They insist that the Notice of Appeal, which they filed on the 15th day via LBC, was seasonably filed since the law does not require a specific mode of service for filing a notice of appeal. Besides, even if their appeal was belatedly filed, it should still be given due course in the interest of justice, considering that their counsel had to brave the storm and the floods caused by typhoon “Florita” just to file their Notice of Appeal on time.



Was the Notice of Appeal filed on the 15th day via private courier like LBC considered to be belatedly filed?



It is basic and elementary that a Notice of Appeal should be filed “within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.Under Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, pleadings may be filed in court either personally or by registered mail. In the first case, the date of filing is the date of receipt. In the second case, the date of mailing is the date of receipt. In this case, however, the counsel for petitioners filed the Notice of Appeal via a private courier, a mode of filing not provided in the Rules. Though not prohibited by the Rules, we cannot consider the filing of petitioners’ Notice of Appeal via LBC timely filed. It is established jurisprudence that “the date of delivery of pleadings to a private letter-forwarding agency is not to be considered as the date of filing thereof in court;” instead, “the date of actual receipt by the court x x x is deemed the date of filing of that pleading.” Records show that the Notice of Appeal was mailed on the 15th day and was received by the court on the 16th day or one day beyond the reglementary period. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that the Notice of Appeal was filed out of time.

Neither can petitioners use typhoon “Florita” as an excuse for the belated filing of the Notice of Appeal because work in government offices in Metro Manila was not suspended on July 13, 2006, the day petitioners’ Notice of Appeal was mailed via LBC. And even if we, in the interest of justice, give due course to the appeal despite its late filing, the result would still be the same. The appeal would still be denied for lack of merit. The Decision dated August 30, 1999 is already final and executory


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