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Monthly Archives: December 2012

Did I Miss Anything?

I got so attached with this poem of Tom Wayman (Canadian poet) when it was first introduced to us by Atty. Roberto Rafael Pulido in our Constitutional Law 1 class. As our assignment, we were instructed to watch a video clip by US Supreme Court Justice Breyer in his speech at a gathering on Environmental Protection Act, compiled by C-Span Videos (www.c-span.org).

The poem is a simplistic yet radical answering approach for those students who missed the (previous) class and ask the professors “Did I Miss Anything?“. There are two answers presented by the poet and it could better be explained by the poem itself.

The student asked, and the professor answered:

Nothing. When we realized you weren’t here
we sat with our hands folded on our desks
in silence, for the full two hours

Everything. I gave an exam worth
40 percent of the grade for this term
and assigned some reading due today
on which I’m about to hand out a quiz
worth 50 percent

Nothing. None of the content of this course
has value or meaning
Take as many days off as you like:
any activities we undertake as a class
I assure you will not matter either to you or me
and are without purpose

Everything. A few minutes after we began last time
a shaft of light suddenly descended and an angel
or other heavenly being appeared
and revealed to us what each woman or man must do
to attain divine wisdom in this life and
the hereafter
This is the last time the class will meet
before we disperse to bring the good news to all people
on earth.

Nothing. When you are not present
how could something significant occur?

Everything. Contained in this classroom
is a microcosm of human experience
assembled for you to query and examine and ponder
This is not the only place such an opportunity has been
gathered

but it was one place

And you weren’t here

Straightforward and shattering. It reflects the reality of having to miss nothing or everything. It provides an insight how could a simple one instance of absence can change your destiny.

 
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Posted by on December 20, 2012 in Personal

 

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Submission and Receipt of Bids

Simula ng maaprubahan ang Revised IRR ng RA.9184, dalawang envelope na lamang ang kailangang i-submit. Ayon sa Sec.25.1:

Bidders shall submit their bids through their duly authorized representative using the forms specified in the Bidding Documents in two (2) separate sealed bid envelopes, and which shall be submitted simultaneously. The first shall contain the technical component of the bid, including the eligibility requirements under Section 23.1 of this IRR, and the second shall contain the financial component of the bid.”

Para sa procurement of goods, ito ang dapat nilalaman ng unang envelope:

  1. Eligibility requirements (under Section 23.1 of the IRR);
  2. The bid security in the prescribed form, amount and validity period;
  3. Technical specifications, which may include production/delivery schedule, manpower requirements, and/or after-sales service/parts, if applicable; and,
  4. Sworn statement by the prospective bidder or its duly authorized representative in the form prescribed by the GPPB (Omnibus Sworn Statement):

Para naman sa infrastructure projects, ito ang dapat na nilalaman ng unang envelope:

  1. Eligibility requirements (under Section 23.3 of the IRR);
  2. The bid security in the prescribed form, amount and validity period;
  3. Project Requirements, which shall include the following: (a) Organizational chart for the contract to be bid; (b) List of contractor’s personnel (viz, Project Manager, Project Engineers, Materials Engineers, and Foremen), to be assigned to the contract to be bid, with their complete qualification and experience data; and (c) List of contractor’s equipment units, which are owned, leased, and/or under purchase agreements, supported by certification of availability of equipment from the equipment lessor/vendor for the duration of the project;
  4. Sworn statement by the prospective bidder or its duly authorized representative in the form prescribed by the GPPB (Omnibus Sworn Statement):

Malinaw na magkasama na ang eligibility requirements at ang technical component ng bid sa first envelope. Sa pangalawang envelope naman nakalagay ang lahat ng impormasyon sa halaga ng bid at ang kabuuan ng financial component.

***

Q: Is there a maximum allowable time to complete a procurement process? In submitting a bid, can some of the eligibility requirements be submitted later? 

A: Yes, the allowable time and bid submission restrictions are clear in Sections 25.4 and 25.5 accordingly.

25.4. Bids shall be received by the BAC on the date, time, and place specified in the Invitation to Bid/Request for Expression of Interest. The following periods from the last day of posting of the Invitation to Bid/Request for Expression of Interest up to the submission and receipt of bids shall be observed:

a)      For Goods, a maximum period of forty-five (45) calendar days.

b)      For infrastructure projects, the following maximum periods:

Approved Budget for the Contract (in Philippine currency) Period
Fifty (50) million and below 50 calendar days
Above fifty (50) million 65 calendar days

 c) For consulting services, a maximum period of seventy five (75) calendar days.

25.5. Bids, including the eligibility requirements under Section 23.1 of this IRR, submitted after the deadline shall not be accepted by the BAC.

 
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Posted by on December 10, 2012 in BAC^k Issues

 

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Aguilar vs. Citytrust Finance Corporation (474 SCRA 285)

FACTS:

Petitioners purchased a car from World Cars, Inc. at an agreed price of payable in 90 days and were being made to sign a promissory note, chattel mortgage, disclosures and other documents the dates of which were left blank and which showed that they would still be obliged to pay on installment in 12 months for the car if checks were not cleared. The chattel mortgage was executed in favor of World Cars which embodied a deed of assignment in favor of the respondent. Petitioner issued checks payable to a certain Joselito Perez, representative of World Cars, Inc. and World Cars, Inc. After some time, respondent contacted the petitioner about the latter’s overdue accounts. Petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of chattel mortgage plus damages against respondent and World Cars, Inc. in Quezon City RTC which ruled in favor of herein petitioner. The appellate court modified that of trial court giving effect to the promissory note and its derivative instruments.

ISSUE:

Whether or not World Cars, Inc. is liable to pay the unpaid obligations of petitioners if the latter will be able to prove that they already fully paid the price of the subject car.

RULING:

YES. Since the condition for the instruments to become effective was fulfilled, the obligation on the part of the [petitioners] to be bound thereby did not arise and World Cars did not thus acquire rights thereunder following Art. 1181 of the Civil Code. As no right against the [petitioner] was acquired by World Cars under the promissory note and chattel mortgage, it had nothing to assign to [respondent].  Consequently, [respondent] cannot enforce the instruments against the [petitioner], for an assignee cannot acquire greater rights than those pertaining to the assignor. World Cars, Inc. was ordered to pay the petitioner and the respondent relevant fees, damages and litigation expenses.

 
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Posted by on December 10, 2012 in Case Digests, Civil Law

 

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First Metro Investment Corporation vs. Este del Sol Mountain Reserve, Inc. (362 SCRA 101)

FACTS:

Petitioner FMIC granted respondent a loan of Seven Million Three Hundred Eighty Five Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P7,385,500.00) to finance the construction of a sports complex at Montalban, Rizal. Respondent also executed, as provided for by the Loan Agreement, an Underwriting Agreement with underwriting fee, annual supervision fee and consultancy fee with Consultancy Agreement for four (4) years, coinciding with the term of the loan. The said fees were deducted from the first release of loan. Respondent failed to meet the schedule of repayment. Petitioner instituted an instant collection suit. The trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioner. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court in favor of herein respondents after its factual findings and conclusion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Underwriting and Consultancy Agreements were mere subterfuges to camouflage the usurious interest charged by the petitioner.

RULING:

YES. In the instant case, several facts and circumstances taken altogether show that the Underwriting and Consultancy Agreements were simply cloaks or devices to cover an illegal scheme employed by petitioner FMIC to conceal and collect excessively usurious interest. “Art. 1957.  Contracts and stipulations, under any cloak or device whatever, intended to circumvent the laws against usury shall be void.  The stipulated penalties, liquidated damages and attorney’s fees, excessive, iniquitous and unconscionable and revolting to the conscience as they hardly allow the borrower any chance of survival in case of default. Hence, the instant petition was denied and the assailed decision of the appellate court is affirmed.

 
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Posted by on December 10, 2012 in Case Digests, Civil Law

 

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Philippines Free Press, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (473 SCRA 639)

FACTS:

Petitioner, thru Teodoro Locsin, Sr., filed a case of Annulment of Sale of its building, lot and printing machineries during the regime of Martial Law to private respondent then represented by late B/Gen. Menzi on February 26, 1987. Petitioner contends that there was vitiated consent and gross inadequacy of purchase price during its sale on October 23, 1973. The trial court dismissed petitioner’s complaint and granted private respondent’s counterclaim. It was elevated to the Court of Appeals but was also dismissed for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the action for annulment has already prescribed.

RULING:

YES. Article 391 of the Civil Code pertinently reads “The action for annulment shall be brought within four years. This period shall begin: In cases of intimidation, violence or undue influence, from the time the defect of consent ceases x x x”.

[The Supreme Court] can not accept the petitioners’ contention that the period during which authoritarian rule was in force had interrupted prescription and that the same began to run only on February 25, 1986, when the Aquino government took power.  It is true that under Article 1154 [of the Civil Code] xxx fortuitous events have the effect of tolling the period of prescription.  However, [the Supreme Court] can not say, as a universal rule, that the period from September 21, 1972 through February 25, 1986 involves a force majeure.  Plainly, [the Supreme Court] can not box in the “dictatorial” period within the term without distinction, and without, by necessity, suspending all liabilities, however demandable, incurred during that period, including perhaps those ordered by this Court to be paid.

 
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Posted by on December 10, 2012 in Case Digests, Civil Law

 

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Schmitz Transport & Brokerage Corporation vs. Transport Venture, Inc. (458 SCRA 557)

FACTS:

Petitioner, who was in charge of securing requisite clearances, receive the cargoes from the shipside and deliver it to the consignee  Little Giant Steel Pipe Corporation warehouse at Cainta, Rizal, hired the services of respondent Transport Venture Incorporation (TVI)’s tugboat for the hot rolled steel sheets in coil. Coils were unloaded to the barge but there was no tugboat to pull the barge to the pier. Due to strong waves caused by approaching storm, the barge was abandoned. Later, the barge capsized washing 37 coils into the sea. Consignee was executed a subrogation receipt by Industrial Insurance after the former’s filing of formal claim. Industrial Insurance filed a complaint against both petitioner and respondent herein. The trial court held that petitioner and respondent TVI were jointly and severally liable for the subrogation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the loss of cargoes was due to fortuitous event.

RULING:

NO. In order, to be considered a fortuitous event: (1) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of human will; (2) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitute the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen it must be impossible to avoid; (3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in any manner; and (4) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.

Petitioner and respondent TVI were jointly and severally liable for the amount of paid by the consignee plus interest computed from the date of decision of the trial court.

 
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Posted by on December 10, 2012 in Case Digests, Civil Law

 

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International Corporate Bank vs. Gueco (351 SCRA 516)

FACTS:

The respondents obtained a loan from the petitioner to purchase a motor vehicle (car). The respondents defaulted in payment of installments. A civil case was filed by the petitioner which resulted later into negotiations in lowering the remaining unpaid balance from P184,000.00 to P150,000.00, detaining the car until payment thereof. Respondent delivered a manager’s check but petitioner insisted on the signing of “Joint Motion to Dismiss”, still holding the motor vehicle.  Respondent initiated civil action for damages before MTC but the case was dismissed for lack of merit. On appeal to RTC, the decision of MTC was reversed ordering herein petitioners to indemnify the respondents. The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondents are entitled of indemnification for damages.

RULING:

NO. Petitioner’s act of requiring respondents to sign the Joint Motion to Dismiss can not be said to be a deliberate attempt on the part of petitioner to renege on the compromise agreement of the parties. The law presumes good faith. In fact, the act of petitioner bank in lowering the debt of respondent from P184,000.00 to P150,000.00 is indicative of its good faith and sincere desire to settle the case.

The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the RTC was set aside.  Respondents were ordered to pay the original obligation amounting to P150,000.00 to the petitioner upon surrender or cancellation of the manager’s check in the latter’s possession, afterwhich, petitioner is to return the subject motor vehicle in good working condition.

 
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Posted by on December 10, 2012 in Case Digests, Civil Law

 

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