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Berces, Jr. vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 112099. February 21,1995)

16 Apr

ACHILLES C. BERCES, SR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., CHIEF PRESIDENTIAL LEGAL COUNSEL ANTONIO CARPIO and MAYOR NAOMI C. CORRAL OF TIWI, ALBAY, respondents

Ponente: QUIASON

FACTS:

Petitioner filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan two administrative cases against respondent incumbent Mayor  and obtained favorable decision suspending the latter. Respondent Mayor appealed to the Office of the President questioning the decision and  at the same time prayed for the stay of execution in accordance with Sec. 67(b) of the Local Government Code (LGC). The Office of the President thru the Executive Secretary directed “stay of execution”. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was dismissed. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with prayer for mandatory preliminary injunction, assailing the Orders of the Office of the President as having been issued with grave abuses of discretion. Petitioner argued that Sec. 68 of LGC (1991) impliedly repealed Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 (1987).

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sec. 68 of R.A. No. 7160 repealed Sec. 6 of Administrative Order No. 18.

HELD:

NO. Petition was dismissed. “Stay of execution” applied.

RATIO:

The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides that an “appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory.” As worded, there is room to construe said provision as giving discretion to the reviewing officials to stay the execution of the appealed decision. There is nothing to infer therefrom that the reviewing officials are deprived of the authority to order a stay of the appealed order. If the intention of Congress was to repeal Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18, it could have used more direct language expressive of such intention.

An implied repeal predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found between the new and prior laws. In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcible inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws.

 

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