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Monthly Archives: October 2014

Cuevas et al. v. Bacal, [G.R. No. 139382. December 6, 2000]

FACTS

This case involves the appointment and transfer of career executive service officers (CESOs).  More specifically, it concerns the “appointment” of respondent Josefina G. Bacal, who holds the rank of CESO III, to the position of Chief Public Attorney in the Public Attorney’s Office, which has a CES Rank Level I, and her subsequent transfer, made without her consent, to the Office of the Regional Director of the PAO because of the appointment of Atty. Carina Demaisip to the position of Chief Public Defender (formerly Chief Public Attorney). Atty. Bacal filed a petition for quo warranto ruled in her favor by the Court of Appeals. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUES

Whether:

  • (1) Bacal is entitled of security of tenure considering that she belongs to Career Service;
  • (2) security of tenure in the Career Executive Service is acquired with respect to the position or to the rank the officer is holding;
  • (3) CESOs may be shifted from one position to another without violating their security of tenure;
  • (4) Bacal’s unconsented transfer from Acting Chief Public Attorney to Regional Director constitutes a demotion;

RULING

  • (1) No. The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it.  A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. Here, Atty. Bacal has a rank of CESO III “appointed” to a position of CESO I. The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated.
  • (2) Security of tenure in the career executive service is acquired with respect to rank and not to position.The guarantee of security of tenure to members of the CES does not extend to the particular positions to which they may be appointed a concept which is applicable only to first and second-level employees in the civil service but to the rank to which they are appointed by the President. Here, respondent did not acquire security of tenure by the mere fact that she was appointed to the higher position of Chief Public Attorney since she was not subsequently appointed to the rank of CESO I based on her performance in that position as required by the rules of the CES Board.
  • (3) Yes. Members of the Career Executive Service may be reassigned or transferred from one position to another and from one department, bureau or office to another;provided that such reassignment or transfer is made in the interest of public service and involves no reduction in rank or salary; provided, further, that no member shall be reassigned or transferred oftener than every two years. If a CESO is assigned to a CES position with a higher salary grade than that of his CES rank, he is allowed to receive the salary of the CES position. Should he be assigned or made to occupy a CES position with a lower salary grade, he shall continue to be paid the salary attached to his CES rank. Here, there is a valid transfer of Atty. Bacal to the Regional Office as it was made in the interest of public service and she is still compensated according to her CES rank.
  • (4) No. Respondent’s appointment to the position of Chief Public Attorney was merely temporary and that, consequently, her subsequent transfer to the position of Regional Director of the same office, which corresponds to her CESO rank, cannot be considered a demotion, much less a violation of the security of tenure guarantee of the Constitution. The rule that outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to security of tenure applies only to an officer who is appointed – not merely assigned – to a particular station. Such a rule does not proscribe a transfer carried out under a specific statute that empowers the head of an agency to periodically reassign the employees and officers in order to improve the service of the agency.
 
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Posted by on October 14, 2014 in Case Digests, Public Officers

 

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People v. Jalosjos [G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000]

FACTS

The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.

ISSUE

Whether or not being a Congressman is a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law by reason of the “mandate of the sovereign will”.

RULING

NO. While the Constitution guarantees: “x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws.”, this simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The duties imposed by the “mandate of the people” are multifarious. The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. Here, election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. Hence, the performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.

 
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Posted by on October 8, 2014 in Case Digests

 

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De La Victoria v. Judge Burgos [G.R. No. 111190. June 27, 1995]

FACTS

Private respondent Raul Sesbreño sought judgment in his favor and against Assistant City Fiscals Bienvenido N. Mabanto, Jr., and Dario D. Rama, Jr., before the RTC. The decision having become final and executory, on motion of Sesbreño, the trial court ordered its execution. A notice of garnishment was served on petitioner Loreto de la Victoria as City Fiscal of Mandaue City where defendant Mabanto, Jr., was then detailed. The notice directed petitioner not to disburse, transfer, release or convey to any other person except to the deputy sheriff concerned the salary checks or other checks, monies, or cash due or belonging to Mabanto, Jr., under penalty of law.  Petitioner moved to quash the notice of garnishment claiming that he was not in possession of any money, funds, credit, property or anything of value belonging to Mabanto, Jr., except his salary and RATA checks, but that said checks were not yet properties of Mabanto, Jr., until delivered to him.

  

ISSUE

Whether or not petitioner may be compelled to cause the garnishments of Mabanto’ Jr.’s salary and RATA checks.

RULING

NO. Garnishment is considered as a species of attachment for reaching credits belonging to the judgment debtor owing to him from a stranger to the litigation.Emphasis is laid on the phrase “belonging to the judgment debtor” since it is the focal point in resolving the issues raised. The source of the salary of Mabanto, Jr., is public funds. Salary and RATA checks were not owned by Mabanto, Jr., because they were not yet delivered to him, and that petitioner as garnishee has no legal obligation to hold and deliver them to the trial court to be applied to Mabanto, Jr.’s judgment debt. The salary and RATA checks still formed part of public funds and therefore beyond the reach of garnishment proceedings. As a necessary consequence of being public fund, the checks may not be garnished to satisfy the judgment.The rationale behind this doctrine is obvious consideration of public policy.

 
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Posted by on October 8, 2014 in Case Digests

 

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What happened September 2014?

by: Green Day “Wake Me Up When September Ends”
Summer has come and passed
The innocent can never last
wake me up when September endslike my father’s come to pass
seven years has gone so fast
wake me up when September ends

here comes the rain again
falling from the stars
drenched in my pain again
becoming who we are

as my memory rests
but never forgets what I lost
wake me up when September ends

summer has come and passed
the innocent can never last
wake me up when September ends

ring out the bells again
like we did when spring began
wake me up when September ends

here comes the rain again
falling from the stars
drenched in my pain again
becoming who we are

as my memory rests
but never forgets what I lost
wake me up when September ends

Summer has come and passed
The innocent can never last
wake me up when September ends

like my father’s come to pass
twenty years has gone so fast
wake me up when September ends
wake me up when September ends
wake me up when September ends

Well, September tells everything and nothing at the same time. With so many things that transpired, I lost track of time to write something for September. My bad.
Just enjoy the song.
 
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Posted by on October 3, 2014 in Personal

 

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