RSS

Category Archives: Sales

Doromal, et al. v. Court of Appeals and Javellana, G.R. No. L-36083, 05 September 1975.

[BARREDO, J.]

FACTS:

Private respondent (plaintiff) Javellana filed an action for redemption of a co-owned property against petitioners Doromal, et al. (defendants). The Court of First Instance (CFI) dismissed the action for having been made out of time.  The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision and held that although respondent Javellana was informed of her co-owners’ proposal to sell the land in question to petitioners she was, however, “never notified … least of all, in writing”, of the actual execution and registration of the corresponding deed of sale, hence, said respondent’s right to redeem had not yet expired at the time she made her offer for that purpose thru her letter of June 10, 1968 delivered to petitioners on even date.

The other pivotal issue raised by petitioners on relates to the price which respondent offered for the redemption in question. The decision under review states that notwithstanding the fact that “the consideration of P30,000 only was placed in the deed of sale to minimize the payment of the registration fees, stamps and sales tax” and

ISSUE#1: Is a notice to co-owner(s) of a perfected sale a sufficient notice for the counting of the 30-day right of redemption period by a co-owner?

HELD#1: NO, the notice of perfected sale is not sufficient.

We are of the considered opinion and so hold that for purposes of the co-owner’s right of redemption granted by Article 1620 of the Civil Code, the notice in writing which Article 1623 requires to be made to the other co-owners and from receipt of which the 30-day period to redeem should be counted is a notice not only of a perfected sale but of the actual execution and delivery of the deed of sale. This is implied from the latter portion of Article 1623 which requires that before a register of deeds can record a sale by a co-owner, there must be presented to him, an affidavit to the effect that the notice of the sale had been sent in writing to the other co-owners. A sale may not be presented to the register of deeds for registration unless it be in the form of a duly executed public instrument. Moreover, the law prefers that all the terms and conditions of the sale should be definite and in writing. As aptly observed by Justice Gatmaitan in the decision under review, Article 1619 of the Civil Code bestows unto a co-owner the right to redeem and “to be subrogated under the same terms and conditions stipulated in the contract”, and to avoid any controversy as to the terms and conditions under which the right to redeem may be exercised, it is best that the period therefor should not be deemed to have commenced unless the notice of the disposition is made after the formal deed of disposal has been duly executed. And it being beyond dispute that respondent herein has never been notified in writing of the execution of the deed of sale by which petitioners acquired the subject property, it necessarily follows that her tender to redeem the same made on June 10, 1968 was well within the period prescribed by law. Indeed, it is immaterial when she might have actually come to know about said deed, it appearing she has never been shown a copy thereof through a written communication by either any of the petitioners-purchasers or any of her co-owners-vendees. (Cornejo et al. vs. CA et al., 16 SCRA 775.)

ISSUE#2: Can the contention of the petitioners be sustained that redemption price should be the actual amount paid and not that consideration in the deed of sale which is only P30,000?

HELD#2: No, petitioners’ contention cannot be sustained.

As stated in the decision under review, the trial court found that “the consideration of P30,000 only was placed in the deed of sale to minimize the payment of the registration fees, stamps and sales tax.” With this undisputed fact in mind, it is impossible for the Supreme Court to sanction petitioners’ pragmatic but immoral posture. Being patently violative of public policy and injurious to public interest, the seemingly wide practice of understating considerations of transactions for the purpose of evading taxes and fees due to the government must be condemned and all parties guilty thereof must be made to suffer the consequences of their ill-advised agreement to defraud the state. Verily, the trial court fell short of its devotion and loyalty to the Republic in officially giving its stamp of approval to the stand of petitioners and even berating respondent Javellana as wanting to enrich herself “at the expense of her own blood relatives who are her aunts, uncles and cousins.” On the contrary, said “blood relatives” should have been sternly told, as We here hold, that they are in pari-delicto with petitioners in committing tax evasion and should not receive any consideration from any court in respect to the money paid for the sale in dispute. Their situation is similar to that of parties to an illegal contract.

 
Leave a comment

Posted by on April 22, 2017 in Case Digests, Civil Law, Sales

 

Tags: , ,

Arcaina and Banta v. Ingram, G.R. No. 196444, 15 February 2017.

[JARDELEZA, J.]

FACTS: Arcaina is the owner of Lot No. 3230 (property). Arcaina’s attorney-in-fact, Banta, entered into a contract with Ingram for the sale of the property. Banta showed Ingram and the latter’s attorney-in-fact, the metes and bounds of the property and represented that Lot No. 3230 has an area of more or less 6,200 square meters (sq. m.) per the tax declaration covering it. The contract price was P1,860,000.00, with Ingram making installment payments for the property. They also separately executed deeds of absolute sale over the property in Ingram’s favor, dated March 21, 2005 by Banta, and April 13, 2005 by Arcaina. Subsequently, Ingram caused the property to be surveyed and discovered that Lot No. 3230 has an area of 12,000 sq. m. Upon learning of the actual area of the property, Banta allegedly insisted that the difference of 5,800 sq. m. remains unsold. This was opposed by Ingram who claims that she owns the whole lot by virtue of the sale.

ISSUE: Was Lot 3230 sold for a lump sum or for a unit price contract? To what extent of lot area is Ingram entitled to?

HELD: Lot No. 3230 was sold for a lump sum. Ingram is entitled only to 6,200 square meters.

In sales involving real estate, the parties may choose between two types of pricing agreement: a unit price contract wherein the purchase price is determined by way of reference to a stated rate per unit area (e.g., P1,000.00 per sq. m.) or a lump sum contract which states a full purchase price for an immovable the area of which may be declared based on an estimate or where both the area and boundaries are stated (e.g., P1 million for 1,000 sq. m., etc.). Here, the Deed of Sale executed by Banta on March 21, 2005 and the Deed of Sale executed by Arcaina on April 13, 2005 both show that the property was conveyed to Ingram at the predetermined price of P1,860,000.00. There was no indication that it was bought on a per-square-meter basis. Thus, Article 1542 of the Civil Code governs the sale.

In a lump sum contract, a vendor is generally obligated to deliver all the land covered within the boundaries, regardless of whether the real area should be greater or smaller than that recited in the deed. However, in case there is conflict between the area actually covered by the boundaries and the estimated area stated in the contract of sale, he/she shall do so only when the excess or deficiency between the former and the latter is reasonable.

Applying Del Prado to the case before us, we find that the difference of 5,800 sq. m. is too substantial to be considered reasonable. We note that only 6,200 sq. m. was agreed upon between petitioners and Ingram. Declaring Ingram as the owner of the whole 12,000 sq. m. on the premise that this is the actual area included in the boundaries would be ordering the delivery of almost twice the area stated in the deeds of sale. Surely, Article 1542 does not contemplate such an unfair situation to befall a vendor — that he/she would be compelled to deliver double the amount that he/she originally sold without a corresponding increase in price. In Asiain v. Jalandoni, we explained that “[a] vendee of a land when it is sold in gross or with the description ‘more or less’ does not thereby ipso facto take all risk of quantity in the land. The use of ‘more or less’ or similar words in designating quantity covers only a reasonable excess or deficiency.” Therefore, we rule that Ingram is entitled only to 6,200 sq. m. of the property. An area of 5,800 sq. m. more than the area intended to be sold is not a reasonable excess that can be deemed included in the sale.

 
Leave a comment

Posted by on April 14, 2017 in Case Digests, Civil Law, Sales

 

Tags: , , ,