Category Archives: Political Law

Luz v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 197788, 29 February 2012.


FACTS: PO3 Alteza flagged down Rodel Luz for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmets while driving their motorcyles. PO3 Alteza invited the Luz to come inside their sub-station since the place where he flagged down the Luz is almost in front of the said sub-station. While issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, PO3 Alteza noticed that Luz was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket. Alerted and so, he told the Luz to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it.  Luzo bliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife. Upon seeing the said container, he asked Luz to open it. After Luz opened the container, PO3 Alteza noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it, and that upon his instruction, the former spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu. Luz was later charged for illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Luz claims that there was no lawful search and seizure because there was no lawful arrest. The RTC found that Luz was lawfully arrested. Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.


ISSUE #1: Can Luz be considered lawfully arrested based on traffic violation under the city ordinance, and such arrest lead to a valid search and seizure?

HELD #1: NO, Luz was not lawfully arrested. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.

Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that persons voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.

At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been under arrest. There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged down almost in front of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they were waiting there. There was no intention to take petitioner into custody.

This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly, when there is an intent on the part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the former may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the officers issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the same violation.


ISSUE #2: Assuming that Luz was deemed arrested, was there a valid warrantless search and seizure that can still produce conviction?

HELD#2: NO. Even if one were to work under the assumption that Luz was deemed arrested upon being flagged down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were not complied with.

This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they might make could be used against them. It may also be noted that in this case, these constitutional requirements were complied with by the police officers only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

[T]here being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal. The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. The drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused.


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Jacomille v. Abaya, G.R. No. 212381, 22 April 2015.



Recently, the LTO formulated the Motor Vehicle License Plate Standardization Program (MVPSP) to supply the new license plates for both old and new vehicle registrants.  The DOTC published in newspapers of general circulation the Invitation To Bid for the supply and delivery of motor vehicle license plates for the MVPSP and stated that the source of funding in the amount of P3,851,600,100.00 would be the General Appropriations Act (GAA). However, a perusal of R.A. No. 10352 or the General Appropriations Act of 2013 (GAA 2013), would show that Congress appropriated only the amount of P187,293,000.00 under the specific heading of Motor Vehicle Plate-Making Project. The DOTC proceeded with the bidding process, but delayed in the implementation of the project. The Senate Committee on Public Services conducted an inquiry in aid of legislation on the reported delays in the release of motor vehicle license plates, stickers and tags by the LTO.

Petitioner, by counsel and assisted by Retired Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, instituted this taxpayer suit, averring that he was a diligent citizen paying his correct taxes to the Philippine Government regularly; that he was a registered vehicle owner, as evidenced by the Certificate of Registration of his motor vehicle and a registered licensed driver; that he would be affected by the government issuance of vehicle plates thru its MVPSP upon his renewal of the registration of his vehicle; that not being a participant to the bidding process, he could not avail of the administrative remedies and procedure provided under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9184 or the Government Procurement Reform Act, and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR); that as far as he was concerned, there was no appeal or any plain or speedy remedy available to him.

For the respondents, the OSG stated that the issues presented had been rendered moot and academic as the gap in the budget of MVPSP was already bridged and covered by the full and specific funding by GAA 2014 in the amount of P4,843,753,000.00 for the item “Motor Vehicle Registration and Driver’s Licensing Regulatory Services.” With the signing of MVPSP on February 21, 2014, after the enactment of GAA 2014, the OSG claimed that all objections that petitioner might have, whether right or wrong, had been rendered naught.

On the other hand, JKG-Power Plates averred that petitioner had no locus standi. It pointed out that petitioner had admitted that he was not one of the bidders in MVPSP and so he would not suffer any direct injury. Likewise, the present case was not a proper subject of taxpayer suit because no taxes would be spent for this project. The money to be paid for the plates would not come from taxes, but from payments of vehicle owners, who would pay P450.00 for every pair of motor vehicle license plate, and P120.00 for every motorcycle license plate. Out of the P450.00, the cost of the motor vehicle plate would only be P380.00. In effect, the government would even earn P70.00 from every pair of plate.


  1. Whether the petition should be dismissed for being moot and academic, considering the assailed deficiencies in appropriation have been substantially complied with.
  1. Whether the petitioner has locus standi to bring his case in court.
  1. Whether the petitioner established a taxpayer’s suit.


1. NO.

The rule is well-settled that for a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy – one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. The case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. Where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, and an adjudication thereon would be of no practical u se or value as courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. xxx Nevertheless, there were occasions in the past when the Court passed upon issues although supervening events had rendered those petitions moot and academic. After all, the moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts from resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation .of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

In the case at bench, the issues presented must still be passed upon because paramount public interest is involved and the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. MVPSP is a nationwide project which affects new and old registrants of motor vehicles and it involves P3,851,600,100.00 of the taxpayers’ money. Also, the act complained of is capable of repetition because the procurement process under R.A. No. 9184 is regularly made by various government agencies. Hence, it is but prudent for the Court to rule on the substantial merits of the case.

2. YES.

Locus standi is defined as the right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. The fundamental question is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

In the present case, petitioner justifies his locus standi by claiming that the petition raises issues of transcendental importance and that he institutes the same as a taxpayer’s suit. It must be noted that the Court has provided the following instructive guides to determine whether a matter is of transcendental importance, namely: “(1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in the questions being raised.”

Petitioner sufficiently showed that his case presents a matter of transcendental importance based on the above-cited determinants. He elucidated that, first, around P3.851 billion in public funds stood to be illegally disbursed; second, the IRR of R.A. No. 9184 and R.A. No. 7718 were violated and the contract for MVPSP was awarded to respondent JKG Power Plates despite the utter disregard of the said laws; third, there was no other party with a more direct and specific interest who had raised the issues therein; and fourth, MVPSP had a wide range of impact because all registered motor vehicles owners would be affected.

3. YES.

A person suing as a taxpayer must show that the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. Contrary to the assertion of JKG-Power Plates, MVPSP clearly involves the expenditure of public funds. While the motor vehicle registrants will pay for the license plates, the bid documents and contract for MVPSP indicate that the government shall bear the burden of paying for the project. Every portion of the national treasury, when appropriated by Congress, must be properly allocated and disbursed. Necessarily, an allegation that public funds in the amount of P3.851 billion shall be used in a project that has undergone an improper procurement process cannot be easily brushed off by the Court.


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Steelcase, Inc. v. Design International Selections, Inc. (DISI), G.R. No. 171995, 18 April 2012




Steelcase, Inc. (Steelcase) granted Design International Selections, Inc. (DISI) the right to market, sell, distribute, install, and service its products to end-user customers within the Philippines.Steelcase argues that Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7042 or the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 (FIA) expressly states that the phrase doing business excludes the appointment by a foreign corporation of a local distributor domiciled in the Philippines which transacts business in its own name and for its own account. On the other hand, DISI argues that it was appointed by Steelcase as the latter’s exclusive distributor of Steelcase products.  The dealership agreement between Steelcase and DISI had been described by the owner himself as basically a buy and sell arrangement.



Whether Steelcase had been doing business in the Philippines.



[T]he appointment of a distributor in the Philippines is not sufficient to constitute doing business unless it is under the full control of the foreign corporation. On the other hand, if the distributor is an independent entity which buys and distributes products, other than those of the foreign corporation, for its own name and its own account, the latter cannot be considered to be doing business in the Philippines. Here, DISI was an independent contractor which sold Steelcase products in its own name and for its own account. As a result, Steelcase cannot be considered to be doing business in the Philippines by its act of appointing a distributor as it falls under one of the exceptions under R.A. No. 7042.


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Heirs of Gamboa v. Teves, et al., G.R. No. 176579, 09 October 2012



Movants Philippine Stock Exchange’s (PSE) President, Manuel V. Pangilinan, Napoleon L. Nazareno, and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) contend that the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution has long been settled and defined to refer to the total outstanding shares of stock, whether voting or non-voting. In fact, movants claim that the SEC, which is the administrative agency tasked to enforce the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens in the Constitution and various statutes, has consistently adopted this particular definition in its numerous opinions. Movants point out that with the 28 June 2011 Decision, the Court in effect introduced a “new” definition or “midstream redefinition” of the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution.


Whether the term “capital” includes both voting and non-voting shares.



The Constitution expressly declares as State policy the development of an economy “effectively controlled” by Filipinos. Consistent with such State policy, the Constitution explicitly reserves the ownership and operation of public utilities to Philippine nationals, who are defined in the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 as Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least 60 percent of whose capital with voting rights belongs to Filipinos. The FIA’s implementing rules explain that “[f]or stocks to be deemed owned and held by Philippine citizens or Philippine nationals, mere legal title is not enough to meet the required Filipino equity. Full beneficial ownership of the stocks, coupled with appropriate voting rights is essential.” In effect, the FIA clarifies, reiterates and confirms the interpretation that the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution refers to shares with voting rights, as well as with full beneficial ownership. This is precisely because the right to vote in the election of directors, coupled with full beneficial ownership of stocks, translates to effective control of a corporation.


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Cuevas et al. v. Bacal, [G.R. No. 139382. December 6, 2000]


This case involves the appointment and transfer of career executive service officers (CESOs).  More specifically, it concerns the “appointment” of respondent Josefina G. Bacal, who holds the rank of CESO III, to the position of Chief Public Attorney in the Public Attorney’s Office, which has a CES Rank Level I, and her subsequent transfer, made without her consent, to the Office of the Regional Director of the PAO because of the appointment of Atty. Carina Demaisip to the position of Chief Public Defender (formerly Chief Public Attorney). Atty. Bacal filed a petition for quo warranto ruled in her favor by the Court of Appeals. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.



  • (1) Bacal is entitled of security of tenure considering that she belongs to Career Service;
  • (2) security of tenure in the Career Executive Service is acquired with respect to the position or to the rank the officer is holding;
  • (3) CESOs may be shifted from one position to another without violating their security of tenure;
  • (4) Bacal’s unconsented transfer from Acting Chief Public Attorney to Regional Director constitutes a demotion;


  • (1) No. The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it.  A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. Here, Atty. Bacal has a rank of CESO III “appointed” to a position of CESO I. The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated.
  • (2) Security of tenure in the career executive service is acquired with respect to rank and not to position.The guarantee of security of tenure to members of the CES does not extend to the particular positions to which they may be appointed a concept which is applicable only to first and second-level employees in the civil service but to the rank to which they are appointed by the President. Here, respondent did not acquire security of tenure by the mere fact that she was appointed to the higher position of Chief Public Attorney since she was not subsequently appointed to the rank of CESO I based on her performance in that position as required by the rules of the CES Board.
  • (3) Yes. Members of the Career Executive Service may be reassigned or transferred from one position to another and from one department, bureau or office to another;provided that such reassignment or transfer is made in the interest of public service and involves no reduction in rank or salary; provided, further, that no member shall be reassigned or transferred oftener than every two years. If a CESO is assigned to a CES position with a higher salary grade than that of his CES rank, he is allowed to receive the salary of the CES position. Should he be assigned or made to occupy a CES position with a lower salary grade, he shall continue to be paid the salary attached to his CES rank. Here, there is a valid transfer of Atty. Bacal to the Regional Office as it was made in the interest of public service and she is still compensated according to her CES rank.
  • (4) No. Respondent’s appointment to the position of Chief Public Attorney was merely temporary and that, consequently, her subsequent transfer to the position of Regional Director of the same office, which corresponds to her CESO rank, cannot be considered a demotion, much less a violation of the security of tenure guarantee of the Constitution. The rule that outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to security of tenure applies only to an officer who is appointed – not merely assigned – to a particular station. Such a rule does not proscribe a transfer carried out under a specific statute that empowers the head of an agency to periodically reassign the employees and officers in order to improve the service of the agency.
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Posted by on October 14, 2014 in Case Digests, Public Officers


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Peralta v. Civil Service Commission [G.R. No. 95832. August 10, 1992]


Pursuant to Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) which conferred upon the Commissioner of Civil Service to prescribe, amend and enforce suitable rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of this Civil Service Law, the Commission interpreted provisions of Republic Act No. 2625 amending the Revised Administrative Code and adopted a policy that when an employee who was on leave of absence without pay on a day before or on a day time immediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday or Holiday, he is also considered on leave of absence without pay on such Saturday, Sunday or Holiday. Petitioner Peralta, affected by the said policy, questioned the said administrative interpretation.


Whether or not the Civil Service Commission’s interpretative construction is:

  • (1) valid and constitutional.
  • (2) binding upon the courts.


  • (1) NO. The construction by the respondent Commission of R.A. 2625 is not in accordance with the legislative intent. R.A. 2625 specifically provides that government employees are entitled to leaves of absence with full pay exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays. The law speaks of the granting of a right and the law does not provide for a distinction between those who have accumulated leave credits and those who have exhausted their leave credits in order to enjoy such right. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.The fact remains that government employees, whether or not they have accumulated leave credits, are not required by law to work on Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays and thus they can not be declared absent on such non-working days. They cannot be or are not considered absent on non-working days; they cannot and should not be deprived of their salary corresponding to said non-working days just because they were absent without pay on the day immediately prior to, or after said non-working days. A different rule would constitute a deprivation of property without due process.
  • (2) NO. Administrative construction, is not necessarily binding upon the courts. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, or abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment. When an administrative or executive agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law; and the administrative interpretation of the law is at best advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.

The general rule vis-a-vis legislation is that an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation as inoperative as though it had never been passed.

But, as held in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter State Bank:

. . . . It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such determination is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects — with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate; and particular conduct, private and official.

To allow all the affected government employees, similarly situated as petitioner herein, to claim their deducted salaries resulting from the past enforcement of the herein invalidated CSC policy, would cause quite a heavy financial burden on the national and local governments considering the length of time that such policy has been effective. Also, administrative and practical considerations must be taken into account if this ruling will have a strict restrospective application. The Court, in this connection, calls upon the respondent Commission and the Congress of the Philippines, if necessary, to handle this problem with justice and equity to all affected government employees.


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Victorias Milling Co. Inc. v. Social Security Commission [G.R. No. L-16704. March 17, 1962]


The Social Security Commission issued its Circular No. 22 of the following tenor:

Effective November 1, 1958, all Employers in computing the premiums due the System, will take into consideration and include in the Employee’s remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other media of remuneration. All these will comprise the Employee’s remuneration or earnings, upon which the 3-1/2% and 2-1/2% contributions will be based, up to a maximum of P500 for any one month.

Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner Victorias Milling Company, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Social Security Commission in effect protesting against the circular as contradictory to a previous Circular No. 7, expressly excluding overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the employers’ and employees’ respective monthly premium contributions, and submitting, “In order to assist your System in arriving at a proper interpretation of the term ‘compensation’ for the purposes of” such computation, their observations on Republic Act 1161 and its amendment and on the general interpretation of the words “compensation”, “remuneration” and “wages”. Counsel further questioned the validity of the circular for lack of authority on the part of the Social Security Commission to promulgate it without the approval of the President and for lack of publication in the Official Gazette.


Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation as contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161 empowering the Social Security Commission “to adopt, amend and repeal subject to the approval of the President such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act.”



No. The Commission’s Circular No. 22 is not a rule or regulation that needed the approval of the President and publication in the Official Gazette to be effective, but a mere administrative interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of general policy or opinion as to how the law should be construed. The Circular purports merely to advise employers-members of the System of what, in the light of the amendment of the law, they should include in determining the monthly compensation of their employees upon which the social security contributions should be based. The Circular neither needs approval from the President nor publication in the Official Gazette.


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