Tag Archives: prescription

Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) v. Adil, Confesor and Villafuerte, et al., G.R. No. L-48889, 11 May 1989.


FACTS: On February 10, 1940 spouses Patricio Confesor and Jovita Villafuerte obtained an agricultural loan from the Agricultural and Industrial Bank (AIB), now the Development of the Philippines (DBP), in the sum of P2,000.00, Philippine Currency, as evidenced by a promissory note of said date whereby they bound themselves jointly and severally to pay the account in ten (10) equal yearly amortizations. As the obligation remained outstanding and unpaid even after the lapse of the aforesaid ten-year period, Confesor, who was by then a member of the Congress of the Philippines, executed a second promissory note on April 11, 1961 expressly acknowledging said loan and promising to pay the same on or before June 15, 1961. The trial court ordered the spouses to pay the loan but this was reversed on appeal.


ISSUE#1: Does prescription operate to discharge a debt even if it there was acknowledgment of the debtor?

ISSUE#2: Is the conjugal partnership of Confesor and Villafuerte bound by the execution of the second promissory note?




This is not a mere case of acknowledgment of a debt that has prescribed but a new promise to pay the debt. The consideration of the new promissory note is the pre-existing obligation under the first promissory note. The statutory limitation bars the remedy but does not discharge the debt. A new express promise to pay a debt barred … will take the case from the operation of the statute of limitations as this proceeds upon the ground that as a statutory limitation merely bars the remedy and does not discharge the debt, there is something more than a mere moral obligation to support a promise, to wit a – pre-existing debt which is a sufficient consideration for the new the new promise; upon this sufficient consideration constitutes, in fact, a new cause of action.


Under Article 165 of the Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. As such administrator, all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, are chargeable to the conjugal partnership. No doubt, in this case, respondent Confesor signed the second promissory note for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence the conjugal partnership is liable for this obligation.


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Villaroel v. Estrada, G.R. No. L-47262, 19 December 1940.


FACTS: On May 9, 1912, Alejandro F. Callao, the mother of the defendant Juan F. Villarroel, obtained from the spouses Mariano Estrada and Severina a loan of P1,000 payable after seven years. Alejandra died, leaving as sole heir to the defendant. The spouses Mariano Estrada and Severina also died, leaving as sole heir the plaintiff Bernardino Estrada. On August 9, 1930, the defendant signed a document (Exhibit B) by which it declares the applicant to owe the amount of P1,000, with an interest of 12 percent per year. This action deals with the collection of this amount.

ISSUE: Is the defendant Juan under obligation to pay the loan that already prescribed if he subsequently declared that he owed it to plaintiff Bernardino?


Although the action to recover the original debt has already been prescribed when the claim was filed in this case, the question that arises in this appeal is mainly whether, notwithstanding such a prescription, the action (may be) brought. However, the present action is not based on the original obligation contracted by the defendant’s mother, who has already been prescribed, but in which the defendant contracted on August 9, 1930 upon assuming the fulfillment of that obligation, Already prescribed. Since the defendant is the sole inheritor of the primitive debtor, with the right to succeed in his inheritance, that debt, brought by his mother legally, although it has lost its effectiveness by prescription, is now, however, for a moral obligation, which is consideration Sufficient to create and render effective and enforceable its obligation voluntarily contracted on August 9, 1930 in Exhibit B.

The rule that a new promise to pay a pre-paid debt must be made by the same obligated person or by another legally authorized by it, is not applicable to the present case in which it is not required to fulfill the obligation of the obligee originally, but of which he voluntarily wanted to assume this obligation.


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Heirs of Miranda v. Pablo Miranda G.R. No. 179638, 08 July 2013.



Petitioners’ Complaint for Annulment of Titles and Specific Performance was decided by the RTC against their favor on August 30, 1999. Without any appeal, the Decision became final and executory. On December 11, 2001, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution but was not implemented. On July 8, 2005, respondent filed an Ex-parte Motion praying that the RTC issue a “Break-Open and Demolition Order” in order to compel the petitioners to vacate his property. But since more than five years have elapsed from the time the Writ of Execution should have been enforced, the RTC denied the Motion in its Order dated August 16, 2005. This prompted respondent to file with the RTC a Petition for Revival of Judgment, which was granted.

On July 13, 2006, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal via LBC, which was opposed by respondent on the ground that the Decision dated August 30, 1999 has long become final and executory. Petitioners, in turn, moved for the transmittal of the original records of the case to the CA, insisting that respondent’s opposition is without merit. Finding the appeal barred by prescription, the RTC denied the Notice of Appeal in its Order dated October 10, 2006. Feeling aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Mandamus with the CA praying that their Notice of Appeal be given due course, but was denied on June 14, 2007 for being filed out of time. Petitioners assert that an action to revive judgment is appealable, and that their appeal was perfected on time. They insist that the Notice of Appeal, which they filed on the 15th day via LBC, was seasonably filed since the law does not require a specific mode of service for filing a notice of appeal. Besides, even if their appeal was belatedly filed, it should still be given due course in the interest of justice, considering that their counsel had to brave the storm and the floods caused by typhoon “Florita” just to file their Notice of Appeal on time.



Was the Notice of Appeal filed on the 15th day via private courier like LBC considered to be belatedly filed?



It is basic and elementary that a Notice of Appeal should be filed “within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.Under Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, pleadings may be filed in court either personally or by registered mail. In the first case, the date of filing is the date of receipt. In the second case, the date of mailing is the date of receipt. In this case, however, the counsel for petitioners filed the Notice of Appeal via a private courier, a mode of filing not provided in the Rules. Though not prohibited by the Rules, we cannot consider the filing of petitioners’ Notice of Appeal via LBC timely filed. It is established jurisprudence that “the date of delivery of pleadings to a private letter-forwarding agency is not to be considered as the date of filing thereof in court;” instead, “the date of actual receipt by the court x x x is deemed the date of filing of that pleading.” Records show that the Notice of Appeal was mailed on the 15th day and was received by the court on the 16th day or one day beyond the reglementary period. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that the Notice of Appeal was filed out of time.

Neither can petitioners use typhoon “Florita” as an excuse for the belated filing of the Notice of Appeal because work in government offices in Metro Manila was not suspended on July 13, 2006, the day petitioners’ Notice of Appeal was mailed via LBC. And even if we, in the interest of justice, give due course to the appeal despite its late filing, the result would still be the same. The appeal would still be denied for lack of merit. The Decision dated August 30, 1999 is already final and executory


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Katon v. Palanca, et al., G.R. No. 151149, 07 September 2004.



Petitioner Katon contends that the whole area known as Sombrero Island, located in Tagpait, Aborlan, Palawan, had been classified from forest land to agricultural land and certified available for disposition upon his request and at his instance. However, Palawan authorities then favorably endorsed the request of Respondent Palanca, together with some others, which resulted in the issuance of homestead patent in Palanca’s favor in 1977 among others. In 1999, filed a petition which seeks to nullify the homestead patents and original certificates of title issued in favor of the Palanca et al. as well as the reconveyance of the whole island in his favor. Palanca et al. filed their Answer and Motion to Dismiss. The trial court dismissed Katon’s Complaint as well as his subsequent motion for reconsideration.

Katon filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The petition was dismissed motu proprio pursuant to the appellate court’s residual prerogative. The CA ruled that prescription had already barred the action for reconveyance. Katon questions this dismissal. He submits that the CA erroneously invoked its residual prerogatives under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court when it motu proprio dismissed the Petition for lack of jurisdiction and prescription. According to him, residual prerogative refers to the power that the trial court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, may still validly exercise even after perfection of an appeal. It follows that such powers are not possessed by an appellate court.


Was the Court of Appeals correct in applying residual prerogative in dismissing a case motu proprio based on prescription?


Petitioner has confused what the CA adverted to as its residual prerogatives under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court with the residual jurisdiction of trial courts over cases appealed to the CA.

Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except when (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3) res judicata and (4) prescription are evident from the pleadings or the evidence on record. In the four excepted instances, the court shall motu proprio dismiss the claim or action. xxx On the other hand, residual jurisdiction is embodied in Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, xxx The residual jurisdiction of trial courts is available at a stage in which the court is normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal. In either instance, the trial court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal.

The CA’s motu proprio dismissal of petitioners Complaint could not have been based, therefore, on residual jurisdiction under Rule 41. Undeniably, such order of dismissal was not one for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties, pending the disposition of the case on appeal. What the CA referred to as residual prerogatives were the general residual powers of the courts to dismiss an action motu proprio upon the grounds mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and under authority of Section 2 of Rule 1 of the same rules.


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Republic v. GST Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 190872, 17 October 2013



Respondent GST is a VAT registered domestic corporation primarily engaged in steel and iron products. During taxable years 2004-2005, GST filed claimed for unutilized excess input VAT attributable to its zero rated sales.

Period Date of Filing of
Administrative Claim
For Refund
1st Quarter of year 2004 June 9, 2004
2nd Quarter of year 2004 August 12, 2004
3rd Quarter of year 2004 February 18, 2005
4th Quarter of year 2004 February 18, 2005
1st Quarter of year 2005 May 11, 2005
2nd Quarter of year 2005 November 18, 2005
3rd Quarter of year 2005 November 18, 2005

For failure of CIR to act on its administrative claims, GST filed for a petition for review before the CTA. The CTA granted the petition. CIR filed an MR but was denied. In a petition for review before the CTA En Banc, CIR raised that the appeal before the CTA was filed beyond the reglementary period. GST asserts that under Section 112 (A) of the Tax Code, the prescriptive period is complied with if both the administrative and judicial claims are filed within the two-year prescriptive period; and that compliance with the 120-day and 30-day periods under Section 112 (D) of the Tax Code is not mandatory



Whether GST’s action for refund has complied with the prescriptive periods under the Tax Code.



NO, as to claims in 2004 and first quarter of 2005.

YES, as to second and third quarter of 2005.

The 120-day period is mandatory and jurisdictional.However, the Supreme Court categorically held that BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 dated December 10, 2003 provided a valid claim for equitable estoppel under Section 246 of the Tax Code. BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 expressly states that the “taxpayer-claimant need not wait for the lapse of the 120-day period before it could seek judicial relief with the CTA by way of Petition for Review.” As such, all taxpayers can rely on said ruling from the time of its issuance on December 10, 2003 up to its reversal by the Supreme Court in Aichi on October 6, 2010, where it was held that the 120+30 day periods are mandatory and jurisdictional.

Therefore, GST can benefit from BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 with respect to its claims for refund of unutilized excess input VAT for the second and third quarters of taxable year 2005 which were filed before the CIR on November 18, 2005 but elevated to the CTA on March 17, 2006 before the expiration of the 120-day period (March 18, 2006 being the 120th day). BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 effectively shielded the filing of GST’s judicial claim from the vice of prematurity.

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Posted by on November 24, 2015 in Case Digests, Taxation Law


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Kwok vs. Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corporation (457 SCRA 465)

DONALD KWOK, petitioner,


[G.R. No. 149252.  April 28, 2005]


Petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent corporation for the recovery of accumulated vacation and sick leave credits before the NLRC. Petitioner clung to the verbal contract with Mr. Lim, the President of the respondent corporation and his father-in-law for his claims. Petitioner obtained favorable judgment. In their appeal, respondent averred that the position the petition held was not entitled cash conversions of vacation and sick leave credits. The decision of the Labor Arbiter was reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the reversed decision.


Whether or not the verbal contract in favor of petitioner is valid.


NO. It is true that for a contract to be binding on the parties thereto, it need not be in writing unless the law requires that such contract be in some form in order that it may be valid or enforceable or that it be executed in a certain way, in which case that requirement is absolute and independent. (Art. 1356, NCC) But the court disbelieved petitioner’s testimony and gave credence and probative weight to the collective testimonies of the employees and officers of the respondent corporation, including Mr. Lim, whom the petitioner presented as a hostile witness. Even assuming that the petitioner was entitled of such benefits, there was no record to show the record of absences to arrive at the actual number of leave credits. There was no conformity of such agreement with the Board and if so, such claim was already barred by prescription under Article 291 of the Labor Code.

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Posted by on March 6, 2013 in Case Digests, Civil Law


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Philippines Free Press, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (473 SCRA 639)


Petitioner, thru Teodoro Locsin, Sr., filed a case of Annulment of Sale of its building, lot and printing machineries during the regime of Martial Law to private respondent then represented by late B/Gen. Menzi on February 26, 1987. Petitioner contends that there was vitiated consent and gross inadequacy of purchase price during its sale on October 23, 1973. The trial court dismissed petitioner’s complaint and granted private respondent’s counterclaim. It was elevated to the Court of Appeals but was also dismissed for lack of merit.


Whether or not the action for annulment has already prescribed.


YES. Article 391 of the Civil Code pertinently reads “The action for annulment shall be brought within four years. This period shall begin: In cases of intimidation, violence or undue influence, from the time the defect of consent ceases x x x”.

[The Supreme Court] can not accept the petitioners’ contention that the period during which authoritarian rule was in force had interrupted prescription and that the same began to run only on February 25, 1986, when the Aquino government took power.  It is true that under Article 1154 [of the Civil Code] xxx fortuitous events have the effect of tolling the period of prescription.  However, [the Supreme Court] can not say, as a universal rule, that the period from September 21, 1972 through February 25, 1986 involves a force majeure.  Plainly, [the Supreme Court] can not box in the “dictatorial” period within the term without distinction, and without, by necessity, suspending all liabilities, however demandable, incurred during that period, including perhaps those ordered by this Court to be paid.

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Posted by on December 10, 2012 in Case Digests, Civil Law


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