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Intestate Estate of the Late Vito Borromeo v. Borromeo, G.R. No. L-55000, July 23, 1987.

[GUTIERREZ, JR., J.]

FACTS

Fortunato claimed a portion of the legitime being an illegitimate son of the deceased, by incorporating a Waiver of Hereditary Rights supposedly signed by the rest of the Borromeo’s. In the waiver, of the 9 heirs relinquished to Fortunato their shares in the disputed estate. The petitioners opposed this Waiver for reason that this is without force and effect because there can be no effective waiver of hereditary rights before there has been a valid acceptance of the inheritance from the heirs who intend to transfer the same.

ISSUE

Whether or not a Waiver of Hereditary Rights can be executed without a valid acceptance from the heirs in question.

RULING

YES. The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary rights is that “the properties included in an existing inheritance cannot be considered as belonging to third persons with respect to the heirs, who by fiction of law continue the personality of the former. The heirs succeed the deceased by the mere fact of death. More or less, time may elapse from the moment of the death of the deceased until the heirs enter into possession of the hereditary property, but the acceptance in any event retroacts to the moment of the death, in accordance with article 989 of the Civil Code. The right is vested, although conditioned upon the adjudication of the corresponding hereditary portion.

 

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Posted by on July 25, 2017 in Case Digests, Civil Law, Succession

 

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Okabe v. Judge Gutierrez and Maruyama, G.R. No. 150185, 27 May 2004.

Second Division

[CALLEJO, SR., J.]

FACTS: Maruyama charged Okabe of Estafa. After the preliminary investigation, an Information was filed and a warrant of arrest was issued.  Petitioner posted a personal bail bond in the said amount, duly approved by Judge Demetrio B. Macapagal, the Presiding Judge of Branch 79 of the RTC of Quezon City, who forthwith recalled the said warrant. The approved personal bail bond of the petitioner was transmitted to the RTC of Pasig City on June 21, 2000. Upon her request, the petitioner was furnished with a certified copy of the Information, the resolution and the criminal complaint which formed part of the records of the said case. Petitioner twice left the Philippines but returned. The prosecution moved for the issuance of a hold departure order to hold and prevent any attempt on the part of the petitioner to depart from the Philippines. Petitioner filed a Very Urgent Motion To Lift/Recall Hold Departure Order and/or allow her to regularly travel to Japan. Petitioner filed a motion for the postponement of her arraignment alleging that, in case the trial court ruled adversely thereon, she would refuse to enter a plea and seek relief from the appellate court. The court denied the petitioner’s motions on the ground that when the petitioner posted a personal bail bond for her provisional liberty, she thereby waived her right to question the court’s finding of the existence of probable cause for her arrest and submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court, more so when she filed the motion for the lifting of the hold departure order the court issued, and the motion to defer the proceedings and her arraignment.

ISSUE: Is the application for or filing of bail bond a waiver of one’s right to assail the warrant issued for his arrest?

 

HELD: NO, there is no waiver in application for or filing of a bail.

It bears stressing that Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is a new one, intended to modify previous rulings of this Court that an application for bail or the admission to bail by the accused shall be considered as a waiver of his right to assail the warrant issued for his arrest on the legalities or irregularities thereon. The new rule has reverted to the ruling of this Court in People v. Red. The new rule is curative in nature because precisely, it was designed to supply defects and curb evils in procedural rules. Hence, the rules governing curative statutes are applicable. Curative statutes are by their essence retroactive in application. Besides, procedural rules as a general rule operate retroactively, even without express provisions to that effect, to cases pending at the time of their effectivity, in other words to actions yet undetermined at the time of their effectivity. Before the appellate court rendered its decision on January 31, 2001, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure was already in effect. It behooved the appellate court to have applied the same in resolving the petitioner’s petition for certiorari and her motion for partial reconsideration.

Moreover, considering the conduct of the petitioner after posting her personal bail bond, it cannot be argued that she waived her right to question the finding of probable cause and to assail the warrant of arrest issued against her by the respondent judge. There must be clear and convincing proof that the petitioner had an actual intention to relinquish her right to question the existence of probable cause. When the only proof of intention rests on what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the particular right that no other explanation of his conduct is possible. In this case, the records show that a warrant was issued by the respondent judge in Pasay City for the arrest of the petitioner, a resident of Guiguinto, Bulacan. When the petitioner learned of the issuance of the said warrant, she posted a personal bail bond to avert her arrest and secure her provisional liberty. Judge Demetrio B. Macapagal of the RTC of Quezon City approved the bond and issued an order recalling the warrant of arrest against the petitioner. Thus, the posting of a personal bail bond was a matter of imperative necessity to avert her incarceration; it should not be deemed as a waiver of her right to assail her arrest.

 

 

 

 

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Philippine Journalists, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 162852, 16 December 2004

[YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.]

FACTS

The Revenue District Office  of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued Letter of Authority for Revenue Officer Federico de Vera, Jr. and Group Supervisor Vivencio Gapasin to examine petitioner’s books of account and other accounting records for internal revenue taxes. Revenue District Officer Jaime Concepcion invited petitioner to send a representative to an informal conference for an opportunity to object and present documentary evidence relative to the proposed assessment. Petitioner’s Comptroller, LorenzaTolentino, executed a “Waiver of the Statute of Limitation Under the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC)”. Records show that, it did not bear the date of acceptance, that petitioner was not furnished a copy of the waiver, and the waiver was signed only by the Revenue District Officer. The tax liability exceeds One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).

ISSUE

Whether the waiver is in accordance with RMO No. 20-90 to validly extend the three-year prescriptive period under the NIRC.

HELD

NO.

The waiver document is incomplete and defective and thus the three-year prescriptive period was not tolled or extended and continued to run. Consequently, the Assessment/Demand was invalid because it was issued beyond the three (3) year period. In the same manner, Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy which petitioner received thereafter is also null and void for having been issued pursuant to an invalid assessment.

The NIRC, under Sections 203 and 222, provides for a statute of limitations on the assessment and collection of internal revenue taxes in order to safeguard the interest of the taxpayer against unreasonable investigation. Unreasonable investigation contemplates cases where the period for assessment extends indefinitely because this deprives the taxpayer of the assurance that it will no longer be subjected to further investigation for taxes after the expiration of a reasonable period of time.

A waiver of the statute of limitations under the NIRC, to a certain extent, is a derogation of the taxpayers’ right to security against prolonged and unscrupulous investigations and must therefore be carefully and strictly construed. xxx Thus, the law on prescription, being a remedial measure, should be liberally construed in order to afford such protection.

The waiver is also defective from the government side because it was signed only by a revenue district officer, not the Commissioner, as mandated by the NIRC and RMO No. 20-90. The waiver is not a unilateral act by the taxpayer or the BIR, but is a bilateral agreement between two parties to extend the period to a date certain. The conformity of the BIR must be made by either the Commissioner or the Revenue District Officer. This case involves taxes amounting to more than One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) and executed almost seven months before the expiration of the three-year prescription period. For this, RMO No. 20-90 requires the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to sign for the BIR.

 
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Posted by on November 24, 2015 in Case Digests, Taxation Law

 

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Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Kudos Metal Corporation, G.R. 178087, 05 May 2010

[DEL CASTILLO, J.]

 

FACTS

The CTA En Banc ruled for canceling the assessment notices issued against respondent for having been issued beyond the prescriptive period. It found the first Waiver of the Statute of Limitations incomplete and defective for failure to comply with the provisions of Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 20-90. Thus: the waiver failed to indicate the date of acceptance. Such date of acceptance is necessary to determine whether the acceptance was made within the prescriptive period; And, the fact of receipt by the taxpayer of his file copy was not indicated on the original copy. The requirement to furnish the taxpayer with a copy of the waiver is not only to give notice of the existence of the document but also of the acceptance by the BIR and the perfection of the agreement. The subject waiver is therefore incomplete and defective. As such, the three-year prescriptive period was not tolled or extended and continued to run.

Petitioner argues that the government’s right to assess taxes is not barred by prescription as the two waivers executed by respondent, through its accountant, effectively tolled or extended the period within which the assessment can be made. In disputing the conclusion of the CTA that the waivers are invalid, petitioner claims that respondent is estopped from adopting a position contrary to what it has previously taken. Petitioner insists that by acquiescing to the audit during the period specified in the waivers, respondent led the government to believe that the “delay” in the process would not be utilized against it. Thus, respondent may no longer repudiate the validity of the waivers and raise the issue of prescription.Respondent maintains that prescription had set in due to the invalidity of the waivers executed by Pasco, who executed the same without any written authority from it, in clear violation of RDAO No. 5-01.

ISSUE

Whether the belated assessment of the CIR is still valid and effective on the ground that respondent is already in estoppel.

HELD

NO. 

Section 203 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 (NIRC) mandates the government to assess internal revenue taxes within three years from the last day prescribed by law for the filing of the tax return or the actual date of filing of such return, whichever comes later. Hence, an assessment notice issued after the three-year prescriptive period is no longer valid and effective. Exceptions however are provided under Section 222 of the NIRC.

Section 222 (b) of the NIRC provides that the period to assess and collect taxes may only be extended upon a written agreement between the CIR and the taxpayer executed before the expiration of the three-year period. RMO 20-90 issued on April 4, 1990 and RDAO 05-01 issued on August 2, 2001 lay down the procedure for the proper execution of the waiver

Due to the defects in the waivers, the period to assess or collect taxes was not extended. Consequently, the assessments were issued by the BIR beyond the three-year period and are void.

 
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Posted by on November 24, 2015 in Case Digests, Taxation Law

 

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