Monthly Archives: October 2016

MERALCO, et al. v. Lim, G.R. No. 184769, 05 October 2010.




Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, an administrative clerk at the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO), learned of an anonymous letter that was posted at the door of the Metering Office of the Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which respondent is assigned, denouncing respondent. The letter reads: 

“Cherry Lim:


By Memorandum, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCO’s Human Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCO’s Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as “A/F OTMS Clerk,” in light of the receipt of “… reports that there were accusations and threats directed against [her] from unknown individuals and which could possibly compromise [her] safety and security.”

Respondent questions the propriety of MERALCO’s action in a letter as “highly suspicious…” and being “punitive”, but the latter never responded. Respondent filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan. Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining petitioners from effecting her transfer to the MERALCO Alabang Sector.

The trial court granted the prayers of respondent including the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction directing petitioners to desist from implementing respondent’s transfer until such time that petitioners comply with the disclosures required.


[1] Whether the RTC lacked jurisdiction to over the case and cannot restrain MERALCO’s prerogative as employer to transfer the place of work of its employees.

[2] Is the issuance of the writ outside the parameters expressly set forth in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data? 



[1] YES.

The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a person’s right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of information technology. It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy independently from those provided under prevailing Rules.

[W]rits of …habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful. Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due process clause of the Constitution. It is evident that respondent’s reservations on the real reasons for her transfer – a legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of one’s employment – are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.

[2] YES. 

There is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondent’s right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security. To argue that petitioners’ refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the threats to respondent’s safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from unknown individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her letter as “highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all.” And she even suspects that her transfer to another place of work “betray[s] the real intent of management]” and could be a “punitive move.” Her posture unwittingly concedes that the issue is labor-related.



Tags: , ,

Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, G.R. No. 132254, 29 December 1998.



The ratio decidendi points as the legal basis for setting aside the marriage is paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New Civil Code, the law in force prior to the enactment of the Family Code, on voidable  marriages.

The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, the marriage celebrated between Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay on July 9, 1958 is hereby declared null and void and of no effect as between the parties. xxx”

The conflict lies on the legal connotation and implications of the terms “voidable” and “null and void”.


Which should prevail between the ratio decidendi and the fallo in this case?


It is the ratio decidendi..

[I]t is an elementary principle of procedure that the resolution of the court in a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of a decision or order is the controlling factor as to settlement of rights of the parties and the questions presented, notwithstanding statement in the body of the decision or order which may be somewhat confusing, the same is not without qualification. The foregoing rule holds true only when the dispositive part of a final decision or order is definite, clear and unequivocal and can be wholly given effect without need of interpretation or construction which usually is the case where the order or decision in question is that of a court not of record which is not constitutionally required to state the facts and the law on which the judgment is based.

Assuming that a doubt or uncertainty exists between the dispositive portion and the body of the decision, effort must be made to harmonize the whole body of the decision in order to give effect to the intention, purpose and judgment of the court.


Thus, a reading of the pertinent portions of the decision xxx shows that the marriage is voidable.

Leave a comment

Posted by on October 2, 2016 in Case Digests, Civil Procedure, Remedial Law


Tags: , , , , ,

De los Santos v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. L-29192, 22 February 1971



The parties admit that the owner of the estate, subject matter of the extrajudicial partition agreement, was Pelagia de la Cruz, who died intestate; that defendant-appellant (De la Cruz)is a nephew of the said decedent; that plaintiff-appellee (De los Santos) is a grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, her mother, Marciana de la Cruz, being a niece who predeceased said Pelagia de la Cruz; and that the purpose of the extrajudicial partition agreement was to divide and distribute the estate among the heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz.


What is the effect of an extra-judicial partition which included a person who is not an heir of the deceased?


The extrajudicial partition agreement is void with respect to plaintiff-appellee.

Article 1105 of the Civil Code provides: “A partition which includes a person believed to be a heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect to such person.” Partition of property affected between a person entitled to inherit from the deceased owner thereof and another person who thought he was an heir, when he was not really and lawfully such, to the prejudice of the rights of the true heir designated by law to succeed the deceased, is null and void. A fortiori, plaintiff-appellee could hardly derive from the agreement the right to have its terms enforced.



Tags: ,