Numbers and Letters of my Life

Numbers. All numbers.

Life, especially mine, is full of numbers. It is quite pleasing to my eyes at first glance. I recall the movie The Matrix and its trilogy. The protagonist see things in numbers, in “0” or “1”. On the contrary, it doesn’t even seemed like number. They are simply switches. “Off” or “On”. That is me, before I met you. Although I tried to write certain prose and poetry, they are merely translations of my world of numbers.

Letters. Now letters.

I tried to break apparent monotony in the past by writing letters to the girls I adore. I recall my first time to write a 30-stanza poem way back in sophomore high (when the life of Francisco Balagtas and “Florante at Laura” was thought then) to express my overflowing admiration. I also wrote several “pen pal” letters and “love letters” to the point I realized that it is all about “The Love I Never Felt”. But they were all frustrations. Until I met Rhea.

Numbers and Letters

Modern technology requires not just numbers or letters but combination of both. The convenience on the use of numbers and the complexity of using letters is necessary to produce a stronger password in one’s email account. Plate numbers of vehicles are also alphanumeric to obtain a wider array of combinations. But the most important number-letter combination I cherish is my wife’s name followed by her number in my phonebook; where her mobile number is also her birth date.

What now?

She might think at this point, as I am writing this blog, that either I am studying my lessons in law school, or chatting with someone in the social media. She will realize later it is neither. I always want to make things permanent, or at least semi-permanent. Words uttered may be forgotten. Material things perish. But the power of the pen, now referred to as the power of blogging, is more powerful and vast. It does not only amaze the eyes of a reader but it also penetrates their soul. Its existence is infinite, the moment it is posted in the cyberspace. If you want to shout on the top of your lungs over the mountain, write a blog. It is a virtual substitute but works as the same less the hassle.

143 = I LOVE YOU

5254 = MAHAL NA MAHAL KITA

4444 = MWAH MWAH TSUP TSUP

5823 = HAPPY BIRTHDAY TO YOU

14344 = I LOVE YOU VERY MUCH

7142243 = FOREVER I WANT TO BE WITH YOU

0830 = that is Rhea’s birthdate, to whom I dedicate all the numbers and letters above.

 

On your day…

Your day this year is Friday. TGIF! I’d like to re-blog my post last year.. The feeling never changed. You are still the lady I admired and loved for more than a decade. I love you! mwah!

Legem Advocatus

Today is just like any other Thursday. Subtle, breezy and very idle for many. To many us, this is not a day to go out for many obvious reasons. Work, school and “color coding”. But whatever the reasons may be, no one can stop making this day special for my wife. It’s her birthday.

I cannot help but make this prose to show and speak, at least in my own way, how I wanted to be with her all the time. How I wanted to talk to her all of the time. How I wanted to cherish each and every moment with her as if we are literally as we feel – inseparable. But the rules of the society and the dictates of culture tell us that we need to work. We need to sacrifice our time and be apart in order that we could be together longer.

Without any…

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Manila Electric Company v. Province of Laguna (G.R. No. 131359. May 5, 1999)

FACTS:

MERALCO was granted a franchise by several municipal councils and the National Electrification Administration to operate an electric light and power service in the Laguna. Upon enactment of Local Government Code, the provincial government issued ordinance imposing franchise tax. MERALCO paid under protest and later claims for refund because of the duplicity with Section 1 of P.D. No. 551. This was denied by the governor (Joey Lina) relying on a more recent law (LGC). MERALCO filed with the RTC a complaint for refund, but was dismissed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the imposition of franchise tax under the provincial ordinance is violative of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution and of P.D. 551.

HELD:

No. There is no violation of the non-impairment clause for the same must yield to the inherent power of the state (taxation). The provincial ordinance is valid and constitutional.

RATIO:

The Local Government Code of 1991 has incorporated and adopted, by and large, the provisions of the now repealed Local Tax Code. The 1991 Code explicitly authorizes provincial governments, notwithstanding “any exemption granted by any law or other special law, . . . (to) impose a tax on businesses enjoying a franchise.” A franchise partakes the nature of a grant which is beyond the purview of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.   Article XII, Section 11, of the 1987 Constitution, like its precursor provisions in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, is explicit that no franchise for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except under the condition that such privilege shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress as and when the common good so requires.

 

Caleon v. Agus Development Corp. (G.R. No. 77365. April 7, 1992)

FACTS:

Agus Development Corporation leased to Rita Caleon its lot for P180.00/month. Caleon built a 4-door apartment and sub-leased it at P350.00/door/month without Agus’ consent. Agus’ filed an ejectment suit under Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 25 after Caleon refused to vacate the lot. Caleon argued that B.P. Blg. 25 cannot be applied because there is a perfected contract of lease without any express prohibition on subleasing. The MTC ruled in favor of Agus. It was appealed to the RTC but was dismissed outright. Hence this petition for review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not B.P. Blg. 25 is unconstitutional for being violative of “non-impairment clause” on the ground that it impaired the lease contract.

HELD:

No. B.P. Blg. 25 is valid and constitutional. The lease contract is subordinate to the police power of the state. Petition is denied.

RATIO:

B.P. Blg. 25 is derived from P.D. No. 20 which has been declared by the Supreme Court as police power legislation so that the applicability thereof to existing contracts cannot be denied. The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by and subject to the exercise of police power of the state in the interest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare. In spite of the constitutional prohibition, the State continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people. Legislation appropriate to safeguarding said interest may modify or abrogate contracts already in effect.

 

Tiro v. Judge Hontanosas (G.R. No. L-32312. November 25, 1983)

FACTS:

Zafra Financing Enterprise sued Superintendent Tiro because the latter forbade the former’s collection of salary checks of school teacher from division office, following the issuance of Circular No. 21 s. 1969 by the Director of Public Schools. Zafra sought to compel Tiro to honor the special powers of attorney and to declare Circular No. 21 as illegal. The trial court ruled in favor of Zafra. Tiro sought a petition for review and reversal of trial court’s decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Circular No. 21 s.1969 is invalid for being violative of the non-impairment clause under the Constitution.

HELD:

No. The circular is valid and enforceable, and is never invasive of any contract. Petition is granted.

RATIO:

The salary check of a government officer or employee such as a teacher does not belong to him before it is physically delivered to him. Until that time the check belongs to the Government. Accordingly, before there is actual delivery of the check, the payee has no power over it; he cannot assign it without the consent of the Government. On this basis Circular No. 21 stands on firm legal footing.

 

Ortigas & Co. v. CA (G.R. No. 126102. December 4, 2000)

FACTS:

Ortigas & Co. sold to Emilia Hermoso a parcel of land located in Greenhills Subdivision, San Juan with several restrictions in the contract of sale that said lot be used exclusively for residential purposes, among others, until December 31, 2025. Later, a zoning ordinance was issued by MMC (now MMDA) reclassifying the area as commercial. Private respondent (Ismael Mathay III) leased the subject lot from Hermoso and built a single storey building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales company. Ortigas & Co. filed a petition a complaint which sought the demolition of the constructed car sales company to against Hermoso as it violated the terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale. Trial court ruled in favor of Ortigas & Co. Mathay raised the issue to the Court of Appeals from which he sought favorable ruling. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the zoning ordinance may impair contracts entered prior to its effectivity.

HELD:

Yes. The zoning ordinance, as a valid exercise of police power may be given effect over any standing contract. Hence, petition is denied.

RATIO:

A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police power legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to those already in existence. Non-impairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of police power to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid police power must be read into every contract. Noteworthy, in Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Supreme Court already upheld subject ordinance as a legitimate police power measure.

 

Sangalang v. IAC (G.R. No. 71169. December 22, 1988)

FACTS:

The Mayor of Makati directed Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA) to opening of several streets to the general public, after a series of developments in zoning regulations. All but Jupiter St. was voluntarily opened. The strong opposition later gave way when the municipal officials force-opened the gates of said street for public use. The area ceased to be purely residential. Action for damages was brought against Ayala Corporation and BAVA for alleged breach of contract, to maintain the purely residential status of the area. Other similarly situated also filed their respective cases. All were dismissed in the trial court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the said dismissals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a contract between homeowners and Ayala Corporation violated in opening the Jupiter street for public use.

HELD:

No. There was no contract to speak of in the case, hence nothing was violated.

RATIO:

Petitioners cannot successfully rely on the alleged promise by Ayala Corporation, to build a “[f]ence along Jupiter [street] with gate for entrance and/or exit as evidence of Ayala’s alleged continuing obligation to maintain a wall between the residential and commercial sections. Assuming there was a contract violated, it was still overtaken by the passage of zoning ordinances which represent a legitimate exercise of police power. The petitioners have not shown why Courts should hold otherwise other than for the supposed “non-impairment” guaranty of the Constitution, which is secondary to the more compelling interests of general welfare. The Ordinance has not been shown to be capricious or arbitrary or unreasonable to warrant the reversal of the judgments so appealed.

 

Villanueva v. Castañeda (G.R. No. L-61311. September 21, 1987)

FACTS:

The case involved a strip of land near public market on which stands a conglomeration of vendor stalls known as talipapa. Said vendors was authorized by Sanggunian resolution to operate. This was protested in a civil case causing an injunction. Pending case, municipal council adopted a new resolution which declared the subject area “the parking space and as the public plaza of the municipality”. The CFI made the injunction permanent. However, the decision apparently was not enforced because the occupants were never evicted. Stall owners were even made to enter a lease agreement with the municipal government. After some time, clamor was raised to restore the area into its public use. The office of the mayor attempted to demolish the stalls. The stall owners filed petition for prohibition but was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the stall owners may validly invoke the non-impairment clause as against the action to restore the area for public use.

HELD:

No. Petition must be denied because the non-impairment clause does not apply here.

RATIO:

A public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and so cannot be the subject of lease or any other contractual undertaking. This is elementary. Applying this well-settled doctrine, the Supreme Court ruled that the petitioners had no right in the first place to occupy the disputed premises and cannot insist in remaining there now on the strength of their alleged lease contracts. The problems caused by the usurpation of the place by the petitioners are covered by the police power as delegated to the municipality under the general welfare clause. In fact, every contract affecting the public interest suffers a congenital infirmity in that it contains an implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. This power can be activated at any time to change the provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the paramount police power.

 

Rutter v. Esteban (G.R. No. L-3708. May 18, 1953)

FACTS:

Rutter sold to Placido a parcel of land through full payment of the half and two installments of the other half of the agreed amount. The first half was paid then war came through Japanese occupation. Rutter filed an action to claim to recover the balance due to the CFI. Esteban set up the defense of moratorium clause embodied in Republic Act No. 342. The CFI dismissed the case upholding the moratorium of 8 years had not yet lapsed. In Rutter’s motion, he raised the constitutionality issue for the first time, but said motion was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Republic Act No. 342 is unconstitutional being violative of the constitutional provision forbidding the impairment of the obligation of contracts (Article III, Section 1, 1935 Constitution).

HELD:

Yes. R.A. No. 342 was declared unconstitutional.

RATIO:

Consistent with what [the Supreme Court] believe to be as the only course dictated by justice, fairness and righteousness, [the Supreme Court] feel that the only way open to us under the present circumstances is to declare that the continued operation and enforcement of Republic Act No. 342 x x x is unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer, and, therefore, the same should be declared null and void and without effect.